Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 10

Issue 1

2009

Law's Misguided Love Affair with Science
Robin Feldman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Robin Feldman, Law's Misguided Love Affair with Science, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 95 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/7

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Article 7

Fedlman R. Law's Misguided Love Affair with Science. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2009;10(1):95-116.

Law’s Misguided Love Affair with Science
Robin Feldman*
“[Our] aim . . . is to encourage the application of scientific methods to
the study of the legal system. As biology is to living organisms,
astronomy to the stars, or economics to the price system, so should
legal studies be to the legal system . . . .”1

The allure of science has always captivated members of the
legal profession. Its siren song has followed us throughout
much of American legal history. Science offers a tune of
perfection, of elegance, of solid dependability, and the promise
of endowing law and legal actors with the respect and deference
from society that we crave. Most importantly, we look to
science to rescue us from the experience of uncertainty and the
discomfort of difficult legal decisions.
The notion of what constitutes science and what it would
take to make law more scientific varies across time. What does
not vary is our constant return to the well. We are constantly
seduced into believing that some new science will provide
answers to law’s dilemmas, and we are constantly
disappointed.
In modern law, one can see many examples in which courts
and scholars reach for science when faced with uncomfortable
legal dilemmas.2 We internalize science by borrowing rules of
© 2009 Robin Feldman.
* Robin Feldman is Professor of Law, Director, Law & Bioscience Project, U.C.
Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to Vik Amar, Margreth Barrett,
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1. Richard A. Posner, Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972).
2. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (forthcoming Feb.
2009). For other perspectives on the interrelation of law and science, see
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW (1999); Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—
the Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3 (1977); Steven Goldberg,
The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341
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science to create legal rules or we externalize our problems by
giving scientists and other experts the power to make legal
decisions. Our deference to these pillars of neutral rationality
is supposed to bring clarity, certainty, and a resolution that all
can respect. The strategy continually fails, however, leaving as
much chaos, confusion, and disagreement as before.
Although the strategy fails, it is exquisitely revealing. It
reflects a persistent image that law is weak and ineffective, a
pale shadow in its own domain of what the sciences can project
(1987); Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76
OR. L. REV. 111 (1997); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899); Richard Lempert, “Between Cup and Lip”:
Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10 LAW & POL’Y 167 (1988); Karl
N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal “Science,” 20 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1941); Howard
T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525
(1984); Roscoe Pound, Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories, 43
YALE. L.J. 525 (1934); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990);
Charles Robert Tremper, Sanguinity and Disillusionment Where Law Meets
Social Science, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267 (1987); John Veilleux, Note, The
Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1987). For perspectives on
American legal theories in general, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1987); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); ANTHONY
J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998); Guido
Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to
the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113 (2003); Ronald M.
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815 (1990); Avery Wiener
Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2229 (1996); Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978); Martha C.
Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1627 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1647 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 521 (1997); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal
Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal
Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001); Howard Schweber, “Langdell,
We Hardly Knew Ye,” 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 145 (1999); see also, Edgar S.
Cahn, An Anthropologist Examines the Lawyer Tribe, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
291 (2005); Daniel R. Ernst, The Lost Law Professor, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
967 (1996); Brian Bix, Positively Positivism, 85 VA. L. REV. 889 (1999)
(reviewing ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought,
106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)); Christopher L. Sagers, Book Note, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1927 (1997) (reviewing GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995)).
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in theirs.
What is most striking about this process is that we
rediscover it, generation after generation, in field after field of
law. Law’s fascination with science reaches back hundreds of
years into American legal history. Throughout this history, the
pattern of behavior reflects our doubts about whether law is
capable of resolving difficult issues and our eternal hope that
science can do it better.
The notion of what constitutes science and what it would
mean to make law more scientific varies across time and among
scholars.3 What does not vary is our constant return to the
well. We continually expect science to rescue us from the
discomfort and uncertainties of law, and we are constantly
disappointed.
This essay describes episodes in law’s misguided love affair
with science across the last two hundred years. Illuminating
the tantalizing traps that we repeatedly fall into may help us
avoid these paths in the future.
I. LAW AS A SCIENCE
Looking back at the first half of the nineteenth century,
many American legal scholars advocated approaching law as a
To some, the notion meant no more than
science.4
conceptualizing law as some form of an organized system,
rather than a loose collection of precedents.5 To others, it
meant approaching “law . . . as an outgrowth of the moral
sciences.”6 To still others, it meant that law was analogous to
natural science.7 The last group, in particular, argued that the
study of law should follow the methods and reasoning of
scientific investigation applied in the natural sciences at the

3. See Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of
the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth Century American Legal Education, 17
LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 421–22 (1999) (comparing differing views of
nineteenth-century legal scholars concerning the meaning of law as a science).
4. See id. at 422 (explaining the differing views described below).
Yearnings to make law into a science did not originate in American legal
history. Other traces can be found in early Roman law and in later European
Law. See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 79, 99 (1999). The
focus of this piece, however, is on the repeated appearance of this theme in
American legal history.
5. Schweber, supra note 3, at 421.
6. Id. at 422.
7. Id.
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time.8 Observations of law, like observations of nature, should
trace the origins and developmental paths of its doctrine to
identify the enduring and stable principles.
“Laws that govern men in society:
operate steadily, constantly, and uniformly; as does the law which
draws the rivulet constantly and steadily down-stream . . . . And as a
particular motion of the stream is not the law of the stream, but only
evidence of the law; so the decision of a court in a particular case is
not the law . . . but it is . . . evidence of the law.”9

In other words, like the natural science taxonomists of the
time, legal scholars should engage in an exhaustive and exact
study of laws and cases to discover the universal and natural
These natural
governing principles of human affairs.10
governing principles were supposed to be universally
acceptable and understandable to all through “common sense,”
given that everyone was presumed to share the experience of
perception and that everyone’s perceptions were presumed to
be consistent.11 This movement represented reconceptualizing
law as analogous to the natural science movement of the time.
This approach, however, failed to bring clarity or universal
agreement concerning legal principles.
Among its many
problems, many scholars following the natural science
approach argued strongly in favor of slavery during the Civil
War.12 When those views were discredited in the post-Civil
War era, the theoretical approaches were discredited as well.13
8. Id.
9. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE LAW 47 (1868); see
also David Dudley Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science, in 1
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 517, 526–27 (A.P. Sprague ed. 1884) (analogizing the proper study of
law to descending from a mountaintop in order to understand the landscape in
its vast, varied, and finite details).
10. See Schweber, supra note 3, at 450–51; see also Daniel Mayes,
Whether Law Is a Science: An Introductory Lecture Delivered to the Law Class
of Transylvania University, on the 8th of November, 1832, 9 AM. JURIST & L.
MAG. 369, 369 (1832) (arguing that “cases are useful; but their greatest use is,
that they serve to illustrate principles. If they are read and not resolved into
elementary principles, the profit of the reading is not worth the time it
occupies”); Stephen A. Siegel, Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215
(1995).
11. See Schweber, supra note 3, at 442–45 (describing the influence of
Scottish Common Sense theory on Baconism and the resulting influence on
nineteenth-century American legal thought of the two combined).
12. Id. at 455–56.
13. Id.
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Law’s love affair with the natural sciences flourished again
in the 1870s and found an institutional home with the arrival
of Christopher Columbus Langdell as the dean of Harvard Law
School.14 Langdell wanted to transform legal education from
the teaching of a craft into a scholarly endeavor worthy of a
place of honor among the great universities of the nation.15 To
bring legal education into this fold, Langdell suggested that
using scientific methods, scholars could identify fundamental
principles and axioms that lawyers could apply to reach the
proper solution to any legal problem.16 Cases would be the data
set for the scientific inquiry, and from this data set, one could
derive the fundamental principles of private law.17
This legal science was not a deductive science, like
mathematics, in which a series of true statements can be used
to derive another statement that is necessarily true.18 Rather,
it was more an inductive, field science, like botany, in which
one uses a series of examples from the available specimens to
derive general principles.19
The notion of law as a clear and structured science also
offered relief from the bewildering array of issues emerging in
the late 1800s.
With industrialization, the range and
complexity of the economic transactions regulated by case law
This change put tremendous
expanded dramatically.20

14. See Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, supra note 2, at 1 (stating when
Langdell became dean).
15. See Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 1629.
16. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, supra note 2, at 5; see Bix, supra note 2,
at 892 (describing Langdell’s inductive approach to discovering the law).
Publications at the time included THE SCIENCE OF LAW, which contained a
foldout chart, “Scheme of a Body of Laws for a Modern State.” SHELDON AMOS,
THE SCIENCE OF LAW 19 (1874) (noting that law is “composed of elements as
permanent and universal as the elements of human nature itself”); E. L.
CAMPBELL, THE SCIENCE OF LAW ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT 6 (Fred. B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1887) (“Our claim is that the
principles of justice are . . . a definite body of immutable principles, and hence
constitute a true science.”); see Veilleux, supra note 2, at 1975 nn.44–48 and
accompanying text (describing these and other scholarly publications of the
late 1800s).
17. See Veilleux, supra note 2, at 1975.
18. Bix, supra note 2, at 892 (noting that Langdell’s analyses were not
deductive).
19. Id.; see SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
192 (1994) (describing inductive reasoning).
20. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1365, 1403 (1997) (“After 1870, the range and complexity of the economic
transactions regulated by the common law grew tremendously.”).
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pressure on a legal system that frequently relied on a judge’s
understanding of long-standing customs.21 One could not rely
on custom in the face of rapid changes in the nature and
complexity of societal interactions. Law, conceptualized as a
structured science, offered the hope of clarity and simplicity in
the increasingly complex legal world. Langdell, for example,
argued that if law could be approached as a science, legal
doctrines “could be so classified and arranged that each should
be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would
cease to be formidable from their number.”22
The legal system, however, stubbornly refused to conform
to any notion of a rational science. Its treasured data bank of
cases failed to reveal a clear structure of higher order principles
branching into ancillary rules, despite valiant efforts at
In particular, critics pointed out that cases
analysis.23
frequently contradicted each other and any apparent guiding
Later attempts to organize the law into
principles.24
restatements and treatises produced great and complex
compendiums lacking the simple clarity suggested in the notion
of law as a science.25

21. Id.
22. Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in
Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661, 661 n.5 (1991) (quoting CHRISTOPHER C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii–ix (2d ed.
1879)).
23. As Austin noted in his lectures on jurisprudence, “[i]deal completeness
and correctness . . . is not attainable . . . . though the system had been built
and ordered with matchless solicitude and skill.” 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE 997–98 (5th ed. 1885).
24. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1935) (noting that the practice of legal
reasoning often ignores facts and practical consequences and rather is based
on the manipulation of legal concepts in certain approved ways); see also
KELMAN, supra note 2, at 46 (“One of the most entertaining sports that [critics
of Langdellian legal science] engaged in was to tweak their treatise-writing,
rule-collecting Formalist forbearers for announcing that they had discovered
legal rules that were, on inspection, utterly vacuous and question begging.”).
25. See Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at 500-01
(describing the collaboration among Langdellians in writing the first
Restatements, and noting the Legal Realist critiques of these Restatements as
well as the treatises of the era); Thurman W. Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale
Observers—A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 811, 820 (1936)
(criticizing restatements).
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II. PROGRESSIVES
As law failed to live up to the notion of an inductive
natural science, other schools of thought emerged in opposition.
For example, the Progressives, including scholars like Holmes,
Pound, and Cardozo, suggested that legislators rather than
judges were the main instruments of law, and argued that law
could be understood as policies rather than rules.26 Many
Progressives felt that although an exact, internal legal science
was a chimera, law could be reconstructed as a policy science
around social science. Law would not be a deductive science
but one of informed experiment in which appropriate legal
actors could use social science to guide them to various policies
that could be tested and refined across time.27
In this context, Progressives urged that legislators and
experts at administrative agencies should apply social science
as a guide to the proper policies. Judges, too, could apply social
science to fill in the gaps left by legislators in their quest for the
right policies, although their role should be limited.28 Thus,
law itself might not be a physical science, but legal actors could
operate like social scientists, engaging in a type of informed
experiment to find their way to an enlightened path for society.
III. LEGAL REALISTS
The Legal Realists followed quickly on the heels of the
Progressives.29 They argued that the Progressives’ cherished
policy science was no more clear or predictable than the rules
and axioms of a natural science approach. Legal Realists
believed that laws and precedents were indeterminate, capable

26. See generally Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at
497-501 (describing the Progressive movement).
27. See id. at 500 (noting the suggestion of Progressive legal scholars that
lawyers should become “social engineers,” systematically investigating social
problems, familiarizing themselves with the available methods of reform, and
testing whether these had the intended effects).
28. See id. at 499 (describing the Progressives’ notion that “Courts should
defer to legislatures in constitutional cases, should ascertain and promote
legislative purpose in interpreting statutes, and should draw on the policies
reflected in statute law to sublegislate the fields left by legislatures to common
law development”).
29. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic
Discipline: Law Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 471, 482–83 (2004) (noting the development of Progressive legal
theories such as those of Roscoe Pound around the turn of the twentieth
century, and the emergence of Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s).
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of a myriad of interpretations. Words, according to the
Realists, are inherently open-ended.30 Moreover, conflicting
rules frequently cover the factual circumstances, and no
autonomous mechanical rules can clearly govern the conflict.31
Realists thought that judges inevitably responded to their
The process of law,
own perspectives and prejudices.32
according to the Realists, involved “intuitive dispute resolution
in the light of unconsciously absorbed custom . . . .”33
Law’s interrelation with science endured for the Realists,
but in a slightly different form. For the Realists, judges and
legal scholars could use social science to better understand
Such self-examination would reveal the
themselves.34
30. See Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (1947) (noting that people’s
annoyance with the way judges sometimes interpret apparently simple
statutory language is based on the false assumption that each verbal symbol
refers to one and only one specific subject, and a denial of the wide range of
ambiguities a word may have that can only be resolved through consideration
of context and background); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947) ( “[Words] are symbols
of meaning. But unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document,
especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate
precision.”); see also KELMAN, supra note 2, at 12–13(describing the Realists).
31. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 45; Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606–14 (1908) (warning against the
cyclical petrifaction of the common law where longstanding legal doctrines are
unexamined and mechanically applied, and ultimately fail to respond to the
human conditions and complexities of present day life).
32. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium,
31 COLUM. L. REV 82, 83 (1931) (reviewing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963) (1930)) (contrasting the myth that the
great bulk of a judge’s work is “mere routine application of accepted rules”
with the reality that no different from witnesses’, a judge’s perception of “the
facts” varies according to temperament and circumstance, and a judge’s
selection, stress, and arrangement of “the facts” can make the most peculiar
case look routine).
33. See Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at 503.
34. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (exploring social scientific selfexamination through the employment of statistical, textual analysis upon the
then-emerging writings of perceived new legal realists in order to discover if
indeed a common school of legal realism existed); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 178–80 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930) (using psychology to
explain that the wish for things certain and secure is an infantile, regressive
tendency and to advocate that judges recognize that all rules and standards
are fictions, to appreciate law’s dynamic qualities, and to “struggle against the
drag of childish nostalgia for the oversecure and impossibly serene . . . .”); see
also Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at 510 (describing
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indeterminate and individualized nature of judging and would
help judges better understand and follow their unconscious
instincts.35 Legal actors were still analogous to social scientists
but the subject of study was legal decision-makers rather than
the law itself.
The Realists’ faith in social science was also reflected in
their devotion to the continued rise of the regulatory state.
Both Realists and Progressives viewed administrative
government as the vehicle for developing scientific solutions to
the economic and social crises of the 1920s and 1930s.36 Judges
were viewed as lacking the means, the expertise, and perhaps
the will to bring about the changes necessary to keep pace with
the tremendous upheavals of the time.37
Administrative agencies during this period were given
extraordinary discretion, in deference to their expertise.38 This
deference was justified on grounds both that agency experts
were superior in capacity and that their expertise made them
more trustworthy. For example, in describing the need for
limited judicial oversight, the Supreme Court commented that
an agency “deals with a subject that is highly specialized and so
complex as to be the despair of judges” and is “better staffed for
its task than is the judiciary.”39 In another case, the Court
expressed its faith in agency experts by noting that “the
training that is required, the comprehensive knowledge which
is possessed, guards or tends to guard against the accidental
abuse of its powers or, if the abuse occur [sic], to correct it.”40
Thus, expertise would make those at agencies the neutral and
dependable arbiters of difficult legal dilemmas.
the Legal Realists).
35. See Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at 501; see
also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 16 (1996)
(noting that legal realists “debunked the rule of law as part of an effort to
improve it” by treating it as a tool of social policy).
36. Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II
and the Decline of Expert Administration, in DANIEL R. ERNST & VICTOR JEW,
TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 185, 201 (2002).
37. See KALMAN, supra note 35, at 18 (describing Supreme Court hostility
to the New Deal and the resulting backlash).
38. See Schiller, supra note 36, at 186–88; Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the
Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of
Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2000) (describing New
Deal era judicial deference to administrative agencies).
39. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943).
40. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218
U.S. 88, 102 (1910).

FELDMAN.WEB

104

2/20/2009 11:58:03 AM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

IV. LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL
Faith in the administrative state was reinforced by the
Legal Process School that began to emerge in the late 1930s in
response to Legal Realism.41 If one’s perspective is hopelessly
clouded and words are inherently open-ended, how does a legal
system function? Most importantly, if the Legal Realists were
right that rules are subject to infinite interpretations and that
perspectives can never be objective, how can law hope to be
anything more than the subjective whims of individual judges?
What rational domain is left for law?42
The Legal Process School offered one response to such
unsettling visions of indeterminacy and unconstrained
discretion. Legal Process argued that law could function best
in the realm of choosing the institution or procedure
appropriate for resolving a particular question.43 Law might
not have a monopoly on finding principles that would yield the
right answer, or on the wise and selfless neutrality that would
lead to a universally acceptable result. Nevertheless, legal
actors might be particularly skilled at identifying which
institutions and processes could function most appropriately for
addressing the question at hand.44
Tucked into the Legal Process perspective was the notion
that the legal system has limited competence for addressing
some of the issues that come before it. In that terrain, legal
actors should simply defer to the experts.45 This instinct to
circumscribe the domain of law by deferring to experts is a
41. See, Bix, supra note 2, at 896 (describing the Legal Process school as a
response to Legal Realism); KALMAN, supra note 35, at 19 (discussing the
timing of the emergence of the Legal Process School).
42. See, Bix, supra note 2, at 896 (describing discomfort in the wake of the
Legal Realist critique).
43. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that the Legal Process school
includes “the proposition that the fundamental political choices we must make
are ones involving the allocation of decision-making authority”).
44. See, Bix, supra note 2, at 897; Calabresi, supra note 2, at 2143–44
(describing the Legal Process school using the issue of ownership of body
parts); see also Schiller, Enlarging the Administration Polity, supra note 37, at
1402 (noting that process theorists such as Bickel, Wechsler, Wellington,
Sachs, and Hart, recommended that “each branch of government undertake
the tasks for which it was best suited”).
45. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
172 (1994) (pointing out that the Legal Process school prefers “[basing]
decisions on . . . deference to other decision makers, especially agencies and
arbitrators”).
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theme that echoes in modern manifestations of law and science.
Critics of the Legal Process School would later suggest that
arguments made about one institution could be made for any
From this perspective, similar
other legal institution.46
arguments of bias and lack of access can be leveled at any
institution in relation to any question. Thus, the promise of
improving law by evaluating and comparing institutions
remained unfulfilled.
In general, law’s euphoria over agency expertise, so strong
in the 1920s and 1930s, soured within a couple of decades. By
the 1950s and 1960s, Americans had gained experience abroad
with the monstrous expressions of administrative power in
fascist states as well as experience at home with wartime
agencies that more often appeared to be “incompetent bullies”
Agencies would
rather than rational, neutral arbiters.47
continue to exist, along with their powerful impact on the
American landscape.
Once admitted, the administrative
expertise would not be expelled. Nevertheless, the image of an
administrative state in which experts would solve the legal
system’s intractable problems faded.48
V. LAW AND ECONOMICS
One cannot examine the interrelation of law and social
science without paying homage to the Law and Economics
movement. Law and Economics is perhaps the most influential
school of thought that has specifically tried to merge law with a
particular social science, in this case economics.49
Law and Economics gained prominence in the 1970s.50 The
elegance and simplicity of Law and Economics offered great
appeal to a legal academic community still reeling from the
devastating critiques of the Legal Realists and the
indeterminacy of Legal Realism.51 Law and Economics can be
46. KELMAN, supra note 2, at 190–91.
47. See Schiller, supra note 37, at 201.
48. See generally id. at 185–201 (describing the disenchantment with the
administrative state and the imposition of due process requirements and court
supervision).
49. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 166 (1993) (“[Law and
Economics] has had the greatest influence on American academic law in the
past quarter-century.”).
50. KELMAN, supra note 2, at 114.
51. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 118 (noting that the so-called Chicago
school of Law and Economics brought a message of simplicity “to an academic
and social world in search of simplicity”); see also Udo Mattei, The Rise and
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seen as suggesting a solution to the turmoil that had plagued
post-Realist legal academics, who had been taught that legal
rules were essentially no more than policy decisions.52
According to Law and Economics, the proper role of legal
actors is to apply the insights of economics, particularly neoclassical price theory, to legal questions in an effort to craft
efficient legal rules that create the proper incentives for
optimal behavior.53 Applying these theories to create legal
rules would promote satisfaction of the greatest possible level
of overall societal wants.54 For example, Law and Economics
scholarship in tort law has suggested that the goal of tort law
and regulation should be to create the proper incentives that
would lead individuals to internalize the consequences that
their decisions inflict on others, thereby minimizing the
divergence between private and social costs.55
In one respect, Law and Economics can be considered a
variant of the Legal Process School. Law and Economics
scholars treat “the market” as a separate institution in itself.
Legal actors must consider whether the institution of the
market is more capable of resolving the problem at hand than
courts or administrative agencies.
Application of Law and Economics concepts requires
acceptance of certain assumptions that many scholars are
unwilling to accept.56 Such assumptions include that human
Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L.
REV. 220, 234–35 (2005) (noting that characteristics such as relative
simplicity, political ambiguity, and universality helped fuel the spread of Law
and Economics).
52. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 125.
53. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 224 (1985) (“One important difference between the neoclassical
market efficiency model [used by Law and Economics scholars] and earlier
economic models is that the neoclassical model claims a much greater ability
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient policies”); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1997) (describing Law and Economics as best being a
“mode of inquiry”); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 822; Katz, supra note 2, at
2238 (noting that positive law and economics sees law merely as a set of
constraints within which individual citizens maximize).
54. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 825–26; see also Katz, supra note 2, at
2248 (1996) (noting Bentham’s nineteenth-century utilitarian idea that a
reasonable comparison of utility across society was possible and would achieve
the greatest good for the greatest number of people).
55. Epstein, supra note 54, at 1171.
56. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 53, at 226–
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wants can be reduced to, and accurately measured in, economic
terms; that human beings are rational actors, and that price
theory is accurate and can be applied with specificity to an
individual occurrence of human or institutional behavior.57
Most controversial is the descriptive claim by some Law and
Economics scholars that the legal system inevitably moves
toward an efficient result.58 Even some prominent Law and
Economics scholars have questioned the validity of that
description.59
Over time, many of the assumptions of Law and Economics
have come under attack.60 Some critics have argued that
human beings are not rational actors possessing full and
complete information.61 Others have argued that human wants
cannot be accurately expressed in economic terms.62 Still
29 (listing basic assumptions of the neoclassical market efficiency model upon
which the law and economics school is based).
57. But see Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 827 (suggesting that “[t]he
profit-maximization hypothesis is probably not verifiable in any universal
sense”).
58. See Epstein, supra note 54, at 1169–70 (criticizing a law and
economics argument by Posner); Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, supra note 2, at
53 (“Posner finds ‘efficiency,’ with all the connotation of approval that term
carries in his theory, in the content as well as the methods of Langdellian
private law.”).
59. See Epstein, supra note 54, at 1170 (“The positive theory of an
efficient common law utterly fails to explain why, with transaction costs in
decline and information more readily available, judicial regulation should be
expected to increase.”); see also John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics
of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (1989)
(comparing Landes’ and Posner’s view that tort law is efficient and serves to
minimize accident losses and prevention costs with Shavell’s more cautious
and qualified approach).
60. See Katz, supra note 2, at 2241 (“Methodological reductionism is a
model, not a metaphysical truth, and, like all models, aesthetic and pragmatic
considerations influence the decision to use it.”).
61. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 37 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);
William J. Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a
Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627,
628 (1999) (noting that the “rational actor” assumption makes it difficult for
Law and Economics scholars to produce sound theories in criminal law); see
also Katz, supra note 2, at 2229 n.2 (citing scholars who are critical of Law
and Economics’ rational choice theory); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal
Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 280–81 (2001) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ED., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000)).
62. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 836 (“Limiting welfare to wealth
maximization amounts to a hopelessly impoverished view of well-being.”);
Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 1636 (citing Amartya Sen and describing the
difficulty of measuring human welfare).
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others have expressed concern that those who engage in Law
and Economics fail to test their hypotheses and conclusions
with the degree of rigor that economists would demand.63
Finally, an increasing body of literature has argued that
institutional interactions are far more complex than originally
suggested by the founders of Law and Economics.64
Despite these criticisms, Law and Economics has had a
profound impact on modern legal thought. Modern courts and
scholars must now try to manage that economic influence and
to make economic insights useful within a judicial setting.65
VI. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
Although less focused on science, one cannot understand
twentieth-century legal thought or the current state of legal
thought without mention of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement. Understanding the criticisms leveled by the CLS
movement is important for understanding the dynamic of what
drives us to look for answers in the form of science.
CLS emerged in the 1970s around the same time as the
emergence of Law and Economics. Unlike the Legal Realists,
CLS scholars did not believe in the complete indeterminacy of
language. Rather, CLS argued that even when language and
legal rules are crystal clear, law is destined to be inherently
contradictory. This contradiction occurs because society is not
63. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 822–23 (criticizing inadequate
hypothesis testing and noting that the danger of dissolving “into a kind of
mathematically supported storytelling is of particular concern in law and
economics”).
64. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315–
16 (1990) (explaining that game theory challenges Law and Economics’
presumption that market competition is efficient because “under at least
certain assumptions markets can fail to promote social welfare”); Michael S.
Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1994)
(“The post-Chicago school builds on the industrial organization approach. [By]
arguing that the broad generalizations of price theory are inappropriate when
small numbers of firms act strategically . . . [to exploit] market imperfections
to [the] disadvantage [of their] competitors.”); Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 683 (2005) (noting that
companies have been known to engage in predatory “overbuying” whereby
inputs are purchased solely to deny them to rivals and then discarded); see
also Epstein, supra note 54, at 1174 (concluding that “the study of legal
doctrine and theory has to be enriched with a greater appreciation of
institutional arrangements”).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 50–66 (offering perspectives on
current debates in law and economics).
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committed to either strict rules or flexible standards as the
proper approach to the interpretation of law.66 Vacillation
between the two inevitably produces instability on every
significant issue, and no resolution is possible.67 Moreover, the
inevitable conflicts cause law to privilege one strain over
another for reasons other than objective analysis and logic.
CLS scholars rejected the notion that legal actors could
ever objectively study the consequences of alternative legal
rules without the distortive effects of the artificial categories
that we create and impose on legal questions.68 Nevertheless,
some CLS scholarship reads much like a psychological analysis
of human beings, following the social science of the time. CLS
scholar Roberto Unger, for example, waxes poetic on the notion
that the self must seek recognition from others in order to
acquire coherence.69 Moreover, many CLS scholars advocated
exposure and awareness of the bias of legal actors, wherever
possible.70 Thus, CLS encouraged legal actors to critically
examine themselves as a focus of study, despite the inevitable
imperfection of the enterprise.

66. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he CLS position has emphasized
the degree to which the question of the extent to which governing bodies are
committed to total rule enforcement is itself invariably ambiguous . . . .”).
67. See id. at 15 (describing the clash between law’s affinity for rules and
its attraction to legal standards).
68. See KELMAN, supra note 2, at 275; see also David M. Trubek, Where
the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575,
617–18 (1984) (“[E]mpirical researchers who spend years analyzing the
answers to complicated surveys about disputes are like madmen wandering in
an asylum that they themselves have constructed.”).
69. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 55–62
(1975); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
53–64, 95–100 (1984).
70. See David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical
Legal Studies and a Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the LawIdea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287, 295 (1987) (“A significant CLS goal is to raise
awareness of unexamined, assailable preferences . . . .”); KELMAN, supra note
2, at 275 (noting that by abandoning those distortions that we can identify we
move toward transformation); Trubek, supra note 68, at 591 (1984) (“While
Critical Legal scholars seek to show relationships between the world views
embedded in modern legal consciousness and domination in capitalist society,
they also want to change that consciousness and those relationships. [Thus,]
the analysis of legal consciousness is part of a transformative politics.”); see
also G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 649, 652 (1984) (noting that CLS’ examination of values extends beyond
the individual preferences of legal actors, but also attacks the collective value
system of legal culture as a whole).
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VII. EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Law and Economics attempts to merge law with the
particular social science of economics. As the twenty-first
century is unfolding, however, the legal system is witnessing
the emergence of a new effort to broadly apply the general
methods of modern social science research to the study of law.
The current ascendance of empirical legal scholarship marks a
new attempt to import general social science methods into the
law, or at least certain social science methods. No one, of
course, suggests that legal actors should engage in double-blind
studies, assigning certain offenders to long prison terms and
others to shorter terms, for example, in order to compare the
results. Nevertheless, scholars engage in statistical analyses of
the results across different jurisdictions that apply varying
approaches.
Empirical studies in the modern legal context generally
involve a model-based approach coupled with application of a
quantitative method.71 Although such approaches are not new,
there has been a recent and dramatic expansion of empirical
scholarship in law as evidenced by working groups at leading
law schools, law review symposia, conferences, seminars, and
other programs.72
The expansion has drawn both enthusiasm and
considerable criticism.73 One extensive study of empirical legal
71. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141 (2006).
72. See id. 142 & 148 (listing examples and noting Harvard’s Program on
Empirical Legal Studies (PELS), UCLA’s Empirical Research Group (ERG),
Washington University’s Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law
(WERL), and a similar program at Northwestern); Theodore Eisenberg, Why
do Empirical Legal Scholarship? 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1742 (2004)
(noting the same programs as well as initiatives at Cornell Law School and
University of Wisconsin Law School).
73. See Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific
Dialogue, 83 N.C.L. REV. 167, 169-174 (2004) (discussing criticisms of modern
empirical legal scholarship and responses to those criticisms); see generally
Elizabeth Chambliss, When do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market
for Empirical Legal Studies, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (2008) (detailing
criticisms of modern empirical legal scholarship and responses); see also
George, supra note 71, at 142 & n. 11 (noting that in 2005, the president of the
American Association of Law Schools designated empirical legal scholarship to
be his tenure in order to “solidify the claim that [the organization is] indeed
THE learned society of scholars for the discipline of law in the United States”);
cf. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide (Between Laws Political
Science), 3 GREEN BAG 2D 267, 268 (2000) (noting that “[L]egal academics
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scholarship concluded that “serious problems of inference and
methodology abound everywhere we find empirical research in
the law reviews and in articles written by members of the legal
community.”74 Other scholars have railed against problems
such as the inadequate training by legal scholars who engage
in empirical work and the ineptitude of student law review
editors. As one scholar noted, “research by law students and
professors with no formal training in social science
methodology provides constant reminders of the limitations of
armchair empiricism.”75 One particularly scathing criticism of
an empirical legal work argued that the work would never have
made it through peer review in a social science journal and that
resulting criticisms of the work’s methodology forced the
author’s peers to perform peer review in public, which occurred
too late to stop the sensational sound bites from becoming
political tools. 76
Although the modern movement of empirical legal
scholarship is still in its infancy, it is already encountering
disappointment. It will be interesting to see how long the
movement lasts, whether the movement has an enduring effect
on the law beyond its glory days, and how the law manages the
problems that are already emerging.
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW
In addition to the more formal movements, our history
abounds with individual moments in which we turn to science
to solve law’s intractable problems. We are constantly seduced
into believing that some new science will provide answers to
vexing legal questions, and we are constantly disappointed.
Consider the criminal law question of when a defendant should
be found not guilty by reason of insanity. For over a century,
the American test for criminal insanity flowed from an 1843
British case focused on the question of whether the defendant
showed a complete lack of cognitive ability at the time of the

routinely make absurd claims that would be rejected out of hand by any
political scientist familiar with the literature in the field.”).
74. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2002).
75. See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327,
1343 (2002).
76. See Chambliss, supra note 73, at 29 (discussing Michele Landis
Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2005)).
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crime.77
Dissatisfaction with the test swelled in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, culminating in passage of Section 4.01 of the
Model Penal Code.78 The new test was widely accepted,
becoming adopted in almost every federal circuit and in many
states as well.79 It was hailed as a triumph of science. The new
test was perceived as embodying the latest advances in
psychological knowledge and medical thought, ones that would
provide authoritative, neutral grounds upon which all could
agree.80 Science would show the way through the difficult
question of whether one should be held criminally accountable
for one’s actions.
The honeymoon was remarkably short-lived. By the early
1980s, courts and legislatures, reacting to highly publicized
cases in which defendants were found not guilty under the new
standard, retreated from the Model Penal Code rule with
California, for example, which had
remarkable speed.81
adopted the Model Penal Code test in a case in 1978, returned
to the prior test with a ballot initiative four years later.82
Our embrace of science and our intense disappointment
with the Model Penal Code insanity test reflect the problems of
trying to import science for the drafting of legal rules. The
question of whom we should hold criminally responsible for
their actions is a question of morality and societal values.83
77. See Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First
Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the
System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1483 (2006) (describing history of the modern
insanity defense and the M’Naghten test); see also M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8
Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (“[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that . . . the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason . . . as not to know the nature and quality of the act.”).
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (imposing
the standard that the defendant was not responsible if, as a result of mental
defect or disease, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of the act or to conform conduct to the requirements of the law).
79. See People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Cal. 1978).
80. Id. at 1324–25.
81. See generally PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL
HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 163–209 (1994).
82. Compare People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324 (1978) (adopting the
Model Penal Code standard) with People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 753, 758–
59 (1985) (interpreting the 1982 California ballot initiative as intending to
return to the M’Naghten standard).
83. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant:
Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L.
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Morality is not easy, and no science can take that burden off
the shoulders of the law.
One could argue that the abandonment of the Model Penal
Code standard reflected popular over-reaction to highly
publicized cases, rather than a carefully considered rejection of
the doctrine based on its inadequacies. Even from this
perspective, however, to the extent that science was expected to
provide an authoritative and neutral resolution behind which
society could rally, it was a dismal failure.
The insanity defense is a particularly good example of law’s
love affair with science. When struggling to reform the old
nineteenth-century test for insanity, courts and scholars not
only tried importing science rules to create a test but also tried
exporting the problem to scientific experts. For example, two
other standards developed in the 1950s and 1960s would have
essentially shifted the decision to expert psychiatrists to opine
on whether the defendant’s behavior fit particular psychiatric
diagnoses. These were the Durham rule, adopted in a case in
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and
the Bonnie Rule, proposed by law professor Richard Bonnie.84
Like the Model Penal Code’s reform, attempts to export the
insanity defense problem failed as well, burdened by criticism
that these approaches would not properly identify those that
society wished to hold morally accountable and instead would
open the door to excessive acquittals. The Durham rule was
reversed by statute and “the Bonnie standard was never
adopted.”85 In lamenting the failed Durham test, Judge
Bazelon, who wrote the Durham opinion, stated “[s]ome think
me a disappointed lover.”86
IX. GOING FORWARD
Our experience with the insanity defense is particularly
important to keep in mind today as we head merrily off into the
REV. 51, 85 (2006) (noting shifts in insanity rules in light of the acquittal of
John Hinckley, who shoting President Reagan, under the Model Penal Codes
standard).
84. Amy D. Gundlack-Evans, State v. Calin: The Paradox of the Insanity
Defense and Guilty but Mentally Ill Statute, Recognizing Impairment Without
Affording Treatment, 51 S.D. L. REV. 122, 136–37 (2006); see also Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral
Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196–97 (1983).
85. See Gundlack-Evans, supra note 85, at 137.
86. See David L. Bazelon, Veils, Value and Social Responsibility, 37 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115 (1982).
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arms of yet another new science that promises to give us a
window into the human mind. Researchers can now use brain
scans to see what portions of the brain are activated by a
particular person during a given activity.87 Proponents of using
such neuroscience in law suggest enthusiastically that the
research will eventually allow the legal system to scientifically
answer questions such as whether certain individuals should
be held accountable for their actions, whether an individual
will engage in future criminal activity, and even the elusive
question of what are our deeply shared beliefs upon which the
legal system should be based.88 Before we are swept away by
the latest vision of science in law, perhaps we should take a
moment to reflect on our past experiences.
Our legal history is full of other examples in which law,
when faced with difficult and unsettling problems, turns to
science in hopes of a solution and is subsequently disappointed.
Similar stories can be told for attempts to let science determine
in a civil commitment proceeding whether an individual is
imminently dangerous to the community or in a criminal
sentencing hearing whether a defendant in sexual or other
crimes is capable of rehabilitation.
The issue has arisen with the question of what is in the
best interest of the child in custody cases. In that arena, courts
increasingly lean on experts to decide the underlying issue, an
inclination that has proven unsatisfying. As one scholar has
noted, “[c]ourts may be only too willing to be relieved of the
responsibility of playing guessing games about a child’s future
if they are persuaded that experts’ crystal balls hold the
answer.”89 The problem is not that we are asking scientists to
answer legal questions. The problem is also that we are asking
scientists to solve our legal quandaries with predictions about
human development that they are unable to provide. Outside
of extreme circumstances such as abuse or neglect—the
situations where legal institutions struggle very little with
uncertainty—psychology “lacks any methodologically sound
87. Anand Giridharadas, India’s Use of Brain Scans in Courts Dismays
HERALD
TRIB.,
Sept.
15,
2008,
available
at
Critics,
INT’L
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/15/asia/15brainscan.php.
88. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on Sand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html.
89. Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in
Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 157, 160 (Lois A. Whitehorn ed., 1987).
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empirical evidence allowing psychological predictions”
concerning various custody arrangements.90
Other examples include legal tests imported into law from
economic or social science research that are then far too
complex to operate in a legal setting. The rules remain, but the
legal system generally is unable to apply them with any
significant degree of accuracy. Consider the updated version of
the Learned Hand test for negligence liability in tort law.91
The rule asks that we set negligence at the point where,
properly internalized, prevention costs do not exceed accident
costs.92 The ordinary machinery of the judicial system has
little capacity to measure that level with any precision.
One can also look at rate setting in public utilities
regulation. Consider Stephen Breyer’s scholarship on rate
regulation prior to joining the bench:
The possibility of court review has led agencies to keep records
demonstrating . . . that [the] decision was rational. . . . Given the
multifaceted nature of most problems, the uncertain quality of the
information, and the need to consider a broad range of uncertain
factors, many technical decisions . . . may reflect only an inspired
engineering guess. The engineer may not know precisely where or
how the decision emerged—even in his own mind—nor can he
necessarily write down a justification for the decision at the time he
made it. Thus, records for court review are often made ex post. The
agency’s lawyers insert into a public record sufficient information to
show rational support for each key decision. Cost/benefit analyses are
often prepared to support decisions already reached rather than to
help determine what future decisions ought to be made.93

Thus, in both formal movements and individual
movements, law continually turns to science to solve its
problems and is continually disappointed. What is important
about this pattern is not just our disappointment, but also our
inevitable return to the well. The repeated behavior is
revealing in that it reflects both our vision of law and our vision
of science in relation to law. We so often despair of law’s
inability to resolve legal issues to our satisfaction and view
science as a source of rescue from our discontent. It is this
90. Id. at 161.
91. The test was first articulated by Judge Learned Hand in 1947. See
U.S. v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d. Cir. 1947) (J. Hand).
92. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles § 4 (Discussion
Draft Apr. 5, 1999); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85–87 (1987) (stating that under proper
economic analysis, the burden to avoid the accident should not be less than the
expected damages.)
93. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 117 (1982).
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particular vision that leads us to pursue an illusory certainty
that science cannot provide.

